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radical reforms and the ability to withstand the distributional consequences. 
It  is  to  be hoped  that  this  missing  element  has  not  deeply  hampered  the 
foundations of a long-term social commitment to a more viable development 
strategy. 
5  Performance and Adjustment 
Patterns in the 1980s 
After the review of  the policy measures in chapter 4, in the present chapter 
we aim to analyze the  performance  and  adjustment patterns of the Turkish 
economy  in  the  post-1980  period.  Following  a  brief  look  at  the  actual 
outcome in section 5.1, in the remainder of the chapter we seek to explicate 
the  major  macrolevel  mechanisms  and  linkages  in  Turkey’s  recent  adjust- 
ment experience. While leaving the quantitative treatment of selected topics 
to  subsequent  chapters,  we  focus  here  on  the  anatomy  of  the  overall 
adjustment process,  including the distributional aspects. 
The main argument  in the present analysis  is that changes  in  macroeco- 
nomic prices have played  a determining role in Turkey’s overall adjustment 
effort.  In this context, we consider the following as macroeconomic prices: 
the  exchange  rate,  interest rates, SEE prices,  real  (urban)  wages, and  net 
prices (or domestic terms of trade) for major sectors. In the Turkish setting, 
real wages and sectoral net prices were determined by and large as residual 
variables, while the exchange rate, interest rate, and SEE prices served more 
directly as policy instruments. 
On the subject of relative prices and distortions, the economic literature has 
been  mainly  concerned  with  microlevel  efficiency  and  welfare  issues.  As 
aptly analyzed by Balassa (1987) recently, and Krueger (1974b) and Bhagwati 
(1971) earlier, policy-induced market distortions tend to have adverse effects 
on  resource  allocation  and  employment. The permanent  removal  of  these 
distortions  would  involve  transitional  costs, but  could  bring  a  continuous 
stream of future benefits,  as emphasized  by  Fischer  (1986).  The post-1980 
Turkish  policies  did  make  a  genuine  effort  to  remove  a  wide  range  of 
distortions that prevailed in the pre- 1980  period, but market imperfections and 
related  inefficiencies  continue  to exist, as discussed  in the  context of  SEE 
prices in section 4.6. The investigation of remaining microeconomic distor- 
tions and their allocational effects is an important item in the agenda of future 
empirical research on Turkey.  But our emphasis in the present chapter is on 
the macroeconomic consequences of a sharply altered relative-price structure, 
as took place in the Turkish economy. 680  Merih Cellsun and Dani Rodrik 
From the analytical standpoint, an integrated treatment of  the various price 
and  nonprice  components  of  the  overall  adjustment  process  is  a  highly 
complex  undertaking.  It  is  preferably  conducted  within  a  multiperiod 
computable general  equilibrium  (CGE)  framework,  incorporating  a  mac- 
romonetary  module  that  captures  the  inflationary  phenomena.  The  CGE 
model  described  in  the  next  chapter  lacks  explicit  mechanisms  for  SEE 
pricing,  inflation,  and  monetary  details.  Hence,  we  have  opted  in  this 
chapter  for an analytic  review  which  is perforce  more ad hoc, but  has the 
advantage that it does not miss out on important aspects. We  make extensive 
use of  the nominal-  and constant-price  series on income, expenditure, and 
savings,  which  have  not  been  closely  examined  in  earlier studies  on the 
Turkish economy.’ 
5.1 
Table 5.1 presents  an overview of  the macroeconomic performance  from 
1980 to 1985, including partially  available data for 1986.3 The GDP growth 
figures  for the  industrial  and  Middle Eastern  economies,  shown as memo 
items  in  the  table,  bring  out  the  inhospitable  nature  of  the  external 
environment, especially from 1980 to 1983. Besides the economic slowdown 
of  its  trade  partners, Turkey,  as  an  oil-importing country,  was  also faced 
with the second oil shock, which involved more than a doubling of imported 
oil  prices  in  the  wake  of  1980.  The  latter  shock,  in  combination  with 
devaluation, resulted  in  a  23 percent  fall  in  the terms of  foreign trade  in 
1980. Because  of  continued exchange rate depreciations, the foreign terms 
of  trade showed further declines in  1981-83. 
The policy  initiatives  in  1980 rapidly  produced  credible results  at  the 
macrolevel  by  lowering  inflation  and  restoring  growth  in  1981-82.  The 
resumption  of  growth  reflected  in  large part export expansion,  as  can be 
observed from the changes in trade ratios. The year 1983 saw some setbacks 
in  policy  and  performance  with  postponed  adjustment  in  SEE prices.  The 
liberalization process and price corrections gained renewed strength in 1984, 
as discussed  in  chapter 4. But  inflation  began  to accelerate. In  1986 the 
sizable fall in the price of imported oil was not adequately  exploited in the 
pursuit  of  price  stabilization,  thanks  to  the  uncurbed  rise  in  public 
expenditures. 
The figures  for current  account balances and their financing patterns  are 
assembled in table 5.2 for the 1980-86  period. To bring out the contribution 
of the debt relief (granted by  the OECD governments), current balances are 
given for before  and after debt relief.4 In  a complementary way,  table 5.3 
lists the main indicators of external debt for the 1981-86  period. 
In a cumulative  way, debt relief  accounted  for nearly 44 percent of total 
financing  for current  deficits  in  1980-85.  Furthermore,  Turkey  benefited 
from large-scale emergency financial assistance from its major creditors.  In 
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Table 5.1  Macroeconomic Performance, 1980-86 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986" 
A.  o/o Annual incrense 




2.  Employment 
3.  GNP deflator 






5. Consumption expenditure 
H. Trade ratios (W of GNP, 
I. Exports of goods (f.o.b.)b 
2.  Exports of goods and services 
3.  Imports of goods (c.i.f.) 
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Nonoil 
4.  Cument account balance 
(after debt relief) 
Memo items: 
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6.  I 
Soin-re:  SPO  and  the  central  bank  of  Turkey  for  Turkish  data;  IMF  World  Economic  Outlook  1986. 
pp.  183-84,  for memo items. 
"Provisional estimates (March 1987). 
blncludes transit trade. 
1980, the first year of  the program, the latter aid resulted in a net resource 
transfer from abroad (excluding relatively minor items connected with FDI) 
amounting to a positive 4.7 percent of GNP. The net resource transfer/GNP 
ratio was  also quite significant in  1981, materializing around  a positive  1 
percent. In the post-1982 period ushered in by  the Mexican financial crisis, 
no  major LDC debtor benefited from such  a positive and  sizable resource 
transfer in launching its adjustment program. We  will return to this aspect of 
the  Turkish  experience  in  chapter  9  when  we  look  at  external  financial 
relations more closely. 
The data summarized in  tables 5.2 and 5.3 also point  to the reversal  in 
debt-service trends starting in 1982. The noninterest current balances turned 
positive (implying negative resource transfers for the  first time),  and debt 
service as a percentage of  GNP began to increase rapidly  (especially after Table 5.2  Financing the Current Account,  1980-86'  (million $) 
1986  1980-85 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  (provisional)  (billion $) 
Parf A: Afrer debt re/ief 
Interest payments 
Nonintereat current account 
Current account balanceb 
Pan B: Before  debt relief 
Current account balance 
Nondebt financing 
Foreign direct investment 
Changes in reserves 
Counterpart to valuation changes 
Net  foreign borrowing 
Long term (LT) 
Debt relieF 
Other LT  (net) 
IMF (net use) 
Implied short term 
Memo items: 
Debt repayment (LT, after relief) 
Debt service (after relief) 
Net resource transfer 
-668  -1,184  -1.465  -1,441  - 
-2.270  -485  630  -387 
-2,938  -  1,669  -835  -  1,828  - 
-3,408  -1.919  -935  -1,898  - 
-475  -loo  -229  -  62 
I8  95  55  46 
-512  -263  -297  -269 
19  68  13 
3.883  2,019  1,164 
2,194  1.165  1,030 
1,450  850  750 
744  315  280 
422  268  129 
1.267  586  5 
-586  -620  -952 
-  1,254  -1.804  -2,417 
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117 
I .540 
-  1,066 













-  142 
353 
-  1,104 
-  2,690 
-  329 
-  171 
-  1,753 
740 
-  1.013 
-  1,013 
298 
95 
-  20 
223 
715 
-  20 
-  20 
-  103 
838 
-  I ,858 
-  3,6l I 
-  1.038 
-2.134 
606 
-  1,528 
-  1.528 
-  169 
125 







-  2,145 
-4,279 
-  437 
-8.1 
-  1.6 
-9.7 
-  10.6 
-0.4 
0.4 
-  1.2 
0.3 







-  14.3 
1.7 
-  100.0%) 










Source:  Central bank of Turkey, IMF, and OECD (1986). The Present data partly reflect the latest available estimates provided in  the  1986 Annual Report of the 
central hank. 
NOIP: Numbers in parentheses are the percentage distribution of current account financing. 
dBased on the revised presentation  of the balance of  payments. 
bCorresponds to foreign savings in the post-1983 national accounts. 
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Table 5.3  External Debt Indicators, 1981-86 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986e 
A.  Billion$ 
1. Debt,’ of which 
Short term (  I)h 
Short term (2)’ 
Excluding gold 
Including goldd 
2.  Net international reserves 
3.  Net indebtedness (incl. gold) 
B. B of GNP 
I. Debt 
2.  Interest payments 
3.  Debt service‘ 
4.  Net resource transfer‘ 
I. Debt 
2.  Debt service‘ 
International reserves (excl. gold) 
C. B of Exports of goods and services 









































































Source:  All figures  are  based  on and/or  derived from  the central bank’s  Annual Reports  (1983-86)  and 
measured in  current prices and official exchange rates. 
aExtemal debt outstanding  and disbursed. 
blncludes all Dresdner scheme deposits. 
‘Excludes  Dresdner scheme deposits with one-year or longer maturity. 
%old  is  revalued  at  216.7,  277.0,  and  332.0  dollars per  ounce at  the  end  of  1984,  1985, and  1986, 
respectively. 
‘Debt  service refers to the sum of interest  payments.  amortization on medium-  and long-term debt, and all 
short-term debt of  less than one-year maturity. 
‘A  minus sign indicates net resource transfer (outflow) abroad. 
eF’rovisional estimates. 
1984), generating additional strains on public  finance, as will be discussed 
more extensively in chapter 8. Notice, however, that the rise in the external 
debt stock from 1984 to 1986 reflects not only the impact of new borrowing, 
but also the valuation effects of dollar depreciation in this subperiod.  Only 
around half  of Turkey’s external debt is denominated  in U.S. dollars  (see 
table A.18 in the stat. app.). 
Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of the post-1980 experience is the 
rapid rise in export/GNP ratios, as shown in table 5.1. Although a fraction of 
this export expansion is attributable to overinvoicing,  as will be explored in 
some  detail  in  chapter  7,  the  export  success  has  been  a  remarkable 
achievement,  given  the  limited  familiarity  with  export  markets  in  the 
pre-reform  period.  Turkish  foreign  policy  has  been  a  supportive factor  in 
broadening export penetration  in the Middle Eastern region, particularly  in 
Iran and Iraq, on the basis of special trade arrangements involving oil import 
schemes  (see  Akder  1987).  The setback  in  the  1986 export  performance 
reflected,  in part, the drop in the oil revenues of the Middle Eastern trading 684  Merih CelLun and Dani Rodrik 
partners.  This  prompted  the  authorities  to  introduce  additional  export 
incentives  in  early  1987 (including  differential  premia  on  specific product 
categories) to redirect exports to the OECD economies. 
A disappointing aspect of the post-1980 recovery effort was the decline in 
private  fixed  investment  in  the  initial  two  years  of  the  program.  The 
cumulative fall of about 40 percent in real terms in investment expenditures 
from  1977 to  1982 was finally halted  in  1983, but  a  buoyant  investment 
climate in export-oriented sectors had not yet arrived by the mid-1980s. As a 
consequence,  the  share  of  the  private  sector  in  total  fixed  investment 
declined  to 41 percent  in  1978-84  from 52 percent  in  1973-77.  Rapidly 
growing  public  investments  have  been  concentrated  in  the  energy  and 
services sectors. There seems to have been a general expectation on the part 
of the authorities that the increase in the production of  exportables would be 
generated  by  private  sector  projects.  However,  the  share  of  agriculture, 
mining,  manufacturing,  and tourism-the  main  sectors for exportables-in 
total private investment decreased to 41  percent in 1978-84  from 51 percent 
in  1973-77.  These investment trends point to the lag in the restructuring of 
the  economy in  a  way  that  would  sustain  an export-led expansion in  the 
medium-term future. 
5.2  Movements in Macroeconomic Prices 
Since the burden of macroeconomic adjustment fell on key relative prices 
in the Turkish economy, we start by examining the changes in the structure 
of macroeconomic prices in the post- 1978 period. We will look subsequently 
at the resulting income and expenditure patterns.  Table 5.4 shows the trends 
in key prices in two groups, separating those that exhibited increases (in real 
terms) from those with decreases. In this table, the net prices of some major 
sectors (such as construction,  transportation, etc.) are not reported to avoid 
undue clutter in the presentation.  We  take  1978 as a base because from then 
on, the Turkish economy began  to adjust  to the debt-precipitated  crisis  of 
mid-1977.  Once  again,  an  upward  movement  in  the  exchange  rate 
(TLiforeign currency) indicates depreciation. 
The pattern in 1979 is different from that after 1980 in one important way. 
In  the absence of  adequate policy  measures, as we described  in chapter 3, 
the  inflationary  process  resulted  in  real  exchange rate  appreciation  and  a 
lower  real  interest  rate  (on  time  deposits).  But  it  also  eroded  the  real 
consumption  wage  and  agricultural  net  price  quite substantially,  a  process 
that  would  not  be reversed  later on.  The net  prices  of  manufacturing  and 
trade (i.e., wholesale and retail  commerce) moved up this year. 
The  policy  shock  in  1980  achieved  a  large  depreciation  of  the  real 
exchange  rate  and  additional  increases  in  the  net  prices  of  energy, 
manufacturing,  and trade sectors.  In turn, it resulted  in a further fall in the 
real  consumption  wage, while eroding government employee salaries. The 
net (after tax) interest rate remained  negative in  1980. 685  TurkeyIChapter 5 
With  the  establishment  of  transitional  military  rule  at the  end of  1980, 
these relative prices,  and especially those that affected distribution directly, 
were  largely  consolidated.  The  implicit  incomes  policy  treated  the  198  1 
structure of relative prices more or less as a guideline in the determination of 
urban  wages  and  agricultural  support prices.  Thus, the real  income  losses 
incurred by  urban  wage earners and agricultural producers during  1978-80 
became an economically permanent and politically unchallenged component 
of  the  1981-85  policies.  It  is  obvious  that  this  particular  aspect  of  the 
post-1980  program  may  not  be  a  transferable  item  in  the  design  of 
adjustment plans elsewhere. 
In those manufacturing branches that had a narrow export orientation and 
limited access to concessional export credits,  the fall  in wage shares could 
not fully offset the rise in interest payments, causing a decline in net profit 
shares  in  1981  and  1982.5 The  resulting  illiquidity,  and  in  some  cases 
insolvency,  problems  were  partly  eased  by  the  provision  of  full  tax 
deductibility of interest payments,  which lowered the corporate tax burden. 
In the case of  the  agricultural  sector, the  fall  in  net  prices reflected  the 
effects of (a) restrained  support prices,  (b) reduced subsidies on inputs, the 
prices of  which  increased  in  real terms, (c) limited incentive benefits  from 
export  promotion  which  heavily  relied  on  manufactures,  (d)  unfavorable 
world  agricultural prices,  and (e) domestic demand  shifts originating  from 
the substantially reduced purchasing power of urban workers. The sharp rise 
in  nonagricultural prices and export incentives resulted in an increase in the 
profit margins in wholesale and retail  trade, which  is reflected  in the trade 
sector net prices in table 5.4. 
Energy  and  mining  prices  soared after  1980 mainly  to improve the  SEE 
profit  position.  The  real  exchange  rate  was  depreciated  in  response  to 
additional  trade  liberalization,  as well  as  to keep  the  export  momentum 
going. In line with the partial liberalization of  external financial  flows, real 
deposit rates were also increased in  1985 (after a fall in  1984). After  1983 
the  government  introduced  tax  rebates  on  wage  and  salary  earners’ 
consumption  expenditures.  This  mechanism  served  as  an  instrument  to 
decrease  (through  a  restrained  stance  on  gross  wage  adjustments)  real 
product wages at a faster rate than real consumption wages, as the relevant 
figures show in table 5.4. 
Finally,  this  review  of  the  post-1978  price  structure  can  be  made  more 
striking by comparing it with the pattern of pre-1978 prices. Figures 5.1 and 
5.2 illustrate the  behavior  of  selected  macroeconomic  prices  for the entire 
1973-85  period.  Figure 5.1 shows the large blows delivered to the Turkish 
economy  by  two  rounds  of  oil  price  increases  in  1973-74  and  1979-80, 
which caused the foreign terms of trade to fall steeply. The pattern depicted 
in  this  figure  is  of  interest  in  that  it  reveals  clearly  the  sharply  divergent 
attitude  of  policymakers  toward  urban  workers  before  and  after the  1977 
crisis.  Prior  to  1977, the  real  consumption  wage  was  on  a  sharp  upward 
trend even though the Turkish economy was hit by substantial terms-of-trade 686  Merih CelAsun and Dani Rodrik 
Table 5.4  Relative Price Movements,  1978-85  (1978 = loo)* 
1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
A.  Increases 
Real exchange rateb 
Real interest rate on  I-yr 
deposits (9%) 
Real sectoral net pricesC 
Energy  + mining 
Manufacturing 
Wholesale & retail trade 
B. Decreases 
Terms of  foreign trade ($) 
Real product waged 
Real consumption wage' 





























































































Source:  Central bank of Turkey for real interest rates (averages of quarterly highest returns); State Institute of 
Statistics for sectoral prices and terms of foreign trade; and SPO for nominal wage data (Tirkiye GeneIi Ifci 
Ucreti) deflated as noted below. 
'For  all prices:  1978 =  100, except for the real interest rate (annual). 
bReal effective exchange rate (TLiforeign currency; export weighted). 
'Ratio  of sectoral value added (factor cost) deflator to GDP deflator. 
dGross wages (labor cost) deflated by the GNP deflator. 
'Net  wages (after tax and tax rebates) deflated by the implicit deflator for private consumption in  the national 
accounts. 
'Government  services value added comprises gross employee salaries. 
shocks. After this date, real consumption wages appear to have borne the full 
brunt of the deterioration in the external terms of trade. 
Figure  5.2 shows further details of  the contrasting policies.  During  the 
mid- 1970s, the agricultural terms of trade improved and the manufacturing 
net  price  declined, while  the  exchange rate  appreciated, lowering the real 
costs of  imported inputs. These trends were reversed in a sharp manner after 
1978-80.  As  the  picture  shows,  the  transformation  in  the  structure  of 
relative  prices  has  been  quite  a  radical  one  in  comparison  to  previous 
experience. 
5.3  Relative Price Changes 
In  this  section,  the  various  balances  of  Turkey's  macroeconomy  are 
presented both in current prices and in constant 1983 prices. The purpose is 
to bring  out  the  impact of  relative  price  changes on basic  macroeconomic 
relations and patterns in pre- and post-1980 periods. 
At the outset, a word of  caution is in order as regards the use of the 1983 
base as a benchmark  for the post-reform  price  system. It may be plausibly 687  TurkeyKhapter 5 
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Fig. 5.1  Terms of foreign trade (TOT) and real consumption wages (RCW) 
Fig. 5.2. 
Note: EER is real effective exchange rate; AGR  is agricultural net price; MAN is manufacturing 
net price; and RPW  is real product wage. 
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argued that the flow equilibrium exchange rate in the mid-1970s  was lower 
(in terms of TUforeign currency) than  the actual  1983 real  exchange rate, 
the latter reflecting the effects both of  the second oil shock and lower world 
agricultural prices.  DerviS and Robinson  (1978) estimated  that  the equilib- 
rium exchange rate exceeded the actual parity by about 25 percent  in  1976 
and 50 percent in  1977. As shown in figure 5.2, the 1983 value of the real 
effective  exchange rate  exceeds the  1976-77  values  by  about 40  percent. 
And  as  analyzed  further in  chapter 6, the  1983 exchange rate  was in  fact 
overvalued  with  respect  to the  objective  of  greater  trade  liberalization  as 
borne out by the actual outcome in  1984 and  1985. Besides exchange rate 
considerations,  the  1983 base also reflects  both  price  corrections  (e.g., the 
SEE price adjustments) that were needed by the Turkish economy for budget 
balancing  and  stabilization.  On account  of  such adjustments, and  with the 
proviso that the  1983 exchange rate be considered  to be close enough to its 
“equilibrium”  level, the use of the  1983 price benchmark  for the review of 
income-expenditure  patterns in real terms appears to be broadly acceptable. 
Largely for convenience, we draw upon SPO (1985) data in our subsequent 
discussion. 
5.3.1  Disposable Income 
A  largely  unexploited  data  set  in  the  existing  literature  on the Turkish 
economy is  the  available  SPO statistics  on the public-private  split  of  the 
nation’s  disposable income, namely  GNP.  Public disposable income is  the 
difference  between  the  public  sector  gross revenue,  including  SEE profits 
and depreciation, and income transfers to the private  sector and rest  of the 
world, including interest payments. In turn, private disposable income is the 
residual between GNP and public disposable income. In Turkey’s macroeco- 
nomic setting, a familiarity with the public-private  split of  GNP is essential 
to  analyze  income-expenditure  patterns  and  overall  saving  (or  resource 
mobilization) behavior (see tables A.  1 -A.4  in the stat. app.). 
Figures  5.3 and  5.4  show  the  ratios  of  public  and  private  disposable 
incomes  to  GNP both  in  current  and  constant  1983  prices  during  the 
1973-83  period.  These  complementary  figures  point  to  the  fact  that  the 
transfer of  income to the public sector from the private sector, as a fraction 
of  GNP,  was larger  in real  terms than  in nominal  (current  price)  terms. In 
other words,  the  transformation  in  the  structure  of  relative  prices  greatly 
increased the real  purchasing  power of  the public  sector, and its command 
over the  economy’s resources  was enhanced  more than  the  nominal-price 
series  shows.  Hence,  in  the  post-1980 period,  the  shift  in  relative  prices 
definitely favored the public sector over the private sector. 
In turn, the rapid reduction  in the  share of  private disposable income  in 
GNP, in constant prices, was the major factor behind the restraint in private 
expenditures.  This made export expansion possible  from the viewpoint  of 
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Fig. 5.3  Private disposable income (PRDY) 
Nore: PRDY(  I) is  PRDYGNP in current prices; and PRDY(2) is PRDYGNP in constant  1983 
prices. 
the  coin  was  that  the enhanced  resources  of  the  public  sector,  thanks to 
relative  price  changes,  allowed  public  savings  to rise,  reducing  the  fiscal 
deficit.  In general, an income transfer from the private  sector to the public 
sector can reduce economywide expenditures only if the marginal propensity 
to save is higher for the latter than it is for the former. This was clearly the 
case in Turkey:  the  private  sector  matched  its cut in  income with  cuts in 
expenditures, whereas the public sector used the transfer mostly to enhance 
savings rather than to expand expenditures. 
5.3.2  Income-Expenditure  and Savings-Investment  Patterns 
Table 5.5 presents  data that  show more precisely  the impact  of  relative 
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Fig. 5.4  Public disposable income (PDY) 
Noret PDY(  I) is PDYiGNP in current prices; and PDY(2) is PDYlGNP in constant 1983 prices. 
table provide  estimates  for the  savings-investment  balances  in  current  and 
constant  prices,  respectively.  These  comparative  data  indicate  that  the 
improvement in these balances from  1980 to  1983 was more substantial in 
the public sector than in the private sector, and more sharply so in real than 
in current prices. 
Part  C  in  table  5.5 displays  data  on the  growth  rates  of  real  (domestic 
final)  expenditures,  which  may  be  compared  with  the  GNP growth  rates 
given in the bottom row of the table.  During  1978-79,  the reduction in the 
current  deficit  and  expenditures  was  engineered  by  import  compression. 
From  1980 to  1982, the  growth  of  expenditures  at  rates  below  the  GNP 
growth was achieved through  expenditure  switching toward exports, which 
was induced by economywide  price adjustments  and supplementary  export 
incentives. As is clear from the data, there was a setback in switching policy 
in 1983. After a reasonable attempt at expenditure restraint  in  1984-85,  the Table 5.5  Relative Price Effects on Investment-Savings Balances,  and Growth of Real Expenditure,  1976-86 
1976-77  1978-79 
Average  Average  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986‘ 








Sectoral savings-investment balances 
Private 
Public 
Total ( = - foreign savings) 
B.  lo GNP, constant  1983 prices 
Sectoral savings-investment balancesb 
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Public 
Total ( = - foreign savings) 
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Source:  SPO (1985) and the central bank’s 1986 Annual Report for 1977-83  and  1984-86  data. respectively. 
‘Current  account deficit (after debt relief). The 1984-86  figures follow the revised presentation of  the central bank for the balance of payments 
bSee table A.2 for other data in constant 1983 prices. 
‘Domestic final expenditure excluding  inventory changes. 
“Provisional estimates. 692  Merih Celasun and Dani Rodrik 
control  over  demand  management  was  considerably  weakened  in  1986, 
when there was also a slowdown  in export expansion. In  1986 the current 
deficit/GNP ratio was higher in constant 1983 prices than in current prices, 
revealing  a  worsening  trend  in  the  external  balance  in  real  terms.  The 
counterpart of this development was a rise in the external debt stock. 
5.3.3  PSBR and Its Financing 
Our estimates for the overall public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) 
and its sources and financing patterns are given, as a percentage of GNP, in 
table 5.6 for the  1980-85  period. To draw attention to the initial conditions, 
this table also contains  average figures  for the 1978-79  period.  As will be 
discussed further in chapter 8, the PSBR figures differ in their basic orders 
of  magnitude  from the public savings gaps. The differences have been  due 
mainly to the valuation adjustments for SEE inventories. 
The rise in public savings has contributed  more to the reduction  in public 
savings  gaps  than  the  restraint  on  public  investment.  The  share  of  the 
nonfinancial  SEEs in total public savings underwent  a drastic change, going 
from a negative 25 percent in  1979 to a positive  14 percent  in  1982 and 50 
percent in 1985. SEE inventory management also began to improve in 1981. 
Hence the  improved  financial performance  of  SEEs, again  mainly  through 
wage-price adjustments, was a key factor in the adjustment  process. 
After the initial fall in  1981, the PSBRGNP ratio remained high through 
1985, averaging 5.8 percent  in  1982-85.  The share of  the  central  bank  in 
PSBR financing steadily declined, while the corresponding share of domestic 
borrowing increased rapidly from 1984 onward. The contribution of external 
borrowing  to  PSBR  financing  was  substantial  at  the  outset  of  the  new 
Table 5.6  The PSBR and its Financing, 1978-85 (current prices, as a percentage of GNP) 
1978-79 
Average  1980  1981  1982  1983  19x4  1985 
Public savings-investment balance 
Public private capital transfer 
Inventory revaluation  fund (SEES) 
Increase in  accounts payable. net 
PSBR 
Financing: 
External borrowing, net 
Domestic borrowing 
Long term 
Short term (treasury bills) 
Central bank, net 
Othe? 
~~  ~~~~  ~~ 
-5.5  -6.2  -4.6  -3.0  -4.2  -3.3  -1.8 
0.0  -0.1  1.2  -0.1  -0.2  -1.3  -0.6 
-3.5  -3.9  -1.7  -  1.5  -2.0  -3.0  -2.0 
0.6  0.3  1.3  -0.3  1.1  -0.3  -0.5 
-8.4  -9.9  -3.7  -5.0  -5.3  -7.9  -4.9 
2.2  3.2  2.5  1.0  1.4  2.7  0.5 
1.1  1.1  1.3  1.5  0.9  2.3  2.7 
1.4  0.2  0.8  0 6  1.8  0.7  1.9 
3.6  3.5  2.0  0.3  0 6  0.7  I  3 
-0.3  0.9  0.6  0.8  -0.9  1.6  0 9 
I  .5  2.2  -2.2  2.2  2.3  2.1  0.4 
Source:  SPO and the central  bank of  Turkey. 
"Includes changes in holdings of  deposits and currency. SEE arrears. and errors and omissions. 693  TurkeyKhapter 5 
program,  facilitating  the  pursuit  of  financial  stabilization  in  the  Turkish 
economy. Further details on public finances will be covered in chapter 8. 
5.3.4  Current Account Deficits and Imports 
The continuation and intensification  of the economywide price distortions 
in  the  mid-1970s  were  enabled  by  heavy  external  borrowing.  This 
observation is reinforced by figure 5.5, which shows the time patterns of the 
current (account) deficit  as a fraction of GNP, both  in current  and constant 
price terms over the  1973-83  period. 
At  the  prevailing  official  exchange  rates  Turkey's  GNP  was  unduly 
overstated  in  U.S.  dollars  in  the  mid-l970s,  giving  rise  to  a  gross 
underestimation of  the current deficit/GNP ratio, which at the time may not 
have looked alarming to most observers. At constant 1983 prices, however, 
Fig. 5.5  Current account deficit (CA) 
Note; CA(  1) is CA/GNP in current prices; and CA(2) is CA/GNP in constant 1983 prices. 694  Merih Celasun and Dani Rodrik 
this ratio was nearly 20 percent in  1976-77  and fell to about 9 percent in 
1978-79.  Accompanying this belated adjustment was a drop in real imports 
as shown in the tabulation of trade ratios in table 5.7. 
These official estimates may possibly contain some measurement errors. 
Nonetheless, they underline three simple, yet highly significant points. First, 
the  scale  of  imports  was  unsustainable  in  1976-77,  but  could  not  be 
evaluated realistically in current prices. The immediate problem in  1977 was 
not  so  much  the  adverse  allocational  effects  of  microlevel  distortions 
produced  by  the  trade  regime,  but  rather  the  sheer  size  of  merchandise 
imports to which the economy had become dependent in a structurally rigid 
way.  This unsustainable pattern collapsed from the inherently destabilizing 
form of  external borrowing described in chapter 2. Second, the import/GNP 
ratio  in  real  terms  was  the  same  in  1980  as  in  1979,  which  was  an 
achievement in the face of the steep rise in the world oil price in 1980. This 
was  made  possible  by  the  large-scale  emergency  financing  extended  to 
Turkey in  the first year of  the  1980-85  program.  Third,  the import/GNP 
ratio recovered only mildly in  1981-82  but, as the share of capital goods in 
total  imports  declined,  there  was  increased  scope  for  intermediate goods 
imports.  This in turn made it possible to increase capacity-utilization rates 
and to embark on an export-led recovery in output. 
5.4  Money and Credit 
An  integral part  of  the  changes  in  the  macroeconomic setting was  the 
shifts in the money and credit system. Table 5.8 provides a summary of data 
on the major monetary variables and credit patterns. 
As discussed earlier in section 4.7 of chapter 4 in the context of quarterly 
data,  the real  demand for broad  money  (M2) responded  favorably to the 
switch to positive real interest rates on time deposits. The new interest rate 
policy  reversed  the  upward  trend  in  the  income  velocity  of  M2  in  the 
pre-1980 period and contributed to lowering the velocity from 5.0 in  1980 to 
about 3.5 in  the  1982-85  period.6 A  monetary modeling exercise by  Fry 
(1986) suggests that the positive deposit rates contributed to the avoidance of 
protracted  recession  in  the  early  1980s through  increased  availability of 
Table 5.7  Trade Ratios (as a percentage of GNP, constant 1983 prices) 
1976-77  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983 
Exports (  f  .a. b.  )  5.1  5.8  4.7  , 5.3  8.5  10. I  11.6 
Imports (c.i.f.)  26.8  18.1  16.2  16.2  17.4  16.6  18.1 
Trade deficit  21.7  12.3  11.5  10.9  8.8  6.5  6.5 
Current deficit  19.8  10.0  7.7  7.6  4.9  3.  I  4. I 
Source: SPO (1985) 695  TurkeyIChapter 5 
Table 5.8  Money and Credit Indicators, 1978-85" 
1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Money multipliers 




GNP/M  I 
GNP/M2 
Domestic credits (DOb 
M2IDC 
GNP/DC 
Domestic credits (%Ib 
by:  Deposit money banks 
Investment  banks 
Central bank 






























1 .5  I .2 
1.8  2.0 
9.3  8.0 
6.3  6.7 
5.0  4.0 
0.7  0.8 
3.3  3.2 
loo  loo 
59  64 
13  12 
28  24 
48  40 
14  13 
34  27 
















1.2  0.8 
2. I  1.9 
7.3  6.7 
5.9  8.1 
3.5  3.5 
1.0  1.2 
3.3  4.3 
loo  loo 
70  72 
13  II 
17  17 
32  28 
LO  12 
22  16 
















Source:  Central bank of  Turkey and OECD (1986). 
"Figures are rounded  to the nearest unit. 
bNet of  central bank advances to the banks. 
credit (which is largely the counterpart of M2) to finance working capital, an 
important complementary input in the production process. 
With the reduction of  the PSBWGNP ratio and decreased public sector 
reliance on the central bank,  important  shifts occurred in  the  structure of 
credits. The share of  direct central bank credit (to the public sector) in total 
domestic credit could be  reduced from  28  percent  in  1980 to  17 and  15 
percent in 1983 and 1985, respectively. The SEE share in direct central bank 
credit was reduced to  13 percent in  1985 from about 50  percent in  1980. 
Consequently, the reduced credit demand by the SEES enabled the rise in the 
private sector's  share in  total domestic credit from 52 percent  in  1980 to 
about 72 percent in 1984. In this context, the rise in export credits was much 
faster than total credit expansion. 
5.5  Anatomy of the Adjustment Process: A Summary 
The analysis of  macroeconomic prices and balances in sections 5.2-5.4 
complements  the  review  of  the  actual  performance  in  section  5.1.  Our 
discussion has focused on the importance of preexisting conditions and on 
the heavily price-based policy mix. 
Prior to  the  1980 program,  Turkey's  adjustment to  the reduced capital 
inflows relied on import reduction and inflationary compression of  domestic 
real  expenditures,  resulting  in  the  loss of  policy  credibility  at  home  and 696  Merih Cellsun and Dani Rodrik 
abroad.  Under  such  initial conditions,  conventional  wisdom  suggested an 
export-oriented orthodox  shock treatment,  which had  a chance to work  in 
the absence of  indexed price and wage adjustments. Having decided on the 
shock treatment option, policymakers relied heavily on sharp changes in the 
macroeconomic price  structure,  which  in  turn  had  vast  consequences for 
unprotected income groups in the Turkish society. 
The exchange rate depreciation,  SEE price hikes,  and switch to positive 
real  interest rates induced both  income and  substitution effects.  The price 
corrections caused a transfer of  real  incomes to the public sector from the 
private sector, making a direct contribution to resource mobilization by  the 
former. The reduction in private disposable income led to the contraction of 
private  expenditures,  with  the  brunt  of  adjustment  falling  on  import- 
intensive  and  interest-rate-sensitive  components  such  as  private  fixed 
investments. The price-induced contraction of domestic demand (mainly for 
traded goods) provided room for export expansion, which was stimulated by 
a strong dose of price and nonprice incentives, as well as real wage cuts. 
The initial stage benefited  from  large-scale external  financial assistance 
and  debt  relief,  which  eased  the  trade-  and  budget-correction  problems, 
especially under the difficult circumstances of  the 1979-80  oil shock. SEE 
price hikes resulted in larger operating surpluses,  reducing dependence on 
central bank financing. The resources of the central bank could be channeled 
to the private sector on a larger scale through the banking system. 
After  attaining a rise  in  exports,  policy  was  increasingly turned  to  the 
liberalization of  the Turkish economy. The liberalization reforms required a 
further  depreciation  of  the  exchange  rate  to  compensate  reductions  in 
quantitative  restrictions  on  imports.  After  contributing  initially  to  price 
stabilization, the adjustment in macroeconomic prices remained as the key 
policy  tool used  to  sustain the  liberalization effort and  strengthen savings 
generation in the Turkish economy (through SEE price hikes to boost public 
savings).  In  turn,  a  heavy  and  continual  reliance  on  economywide price 
changes prevented  smooth and  steady reductions in  the rates of  domestic 
inflation. 
The counterparts of  the exchange rate depreciation, SEE price hikes, and 
switch to positive deposit rates were  lower real  wages and  salaries in the 
urban sector and worsened domestic terms of trade for the agricultural sector, 
which  absorbs  the  bulk  of  employment  in  Turkey.  The  distributional 
consequences of these relative price shifts are reviewed in the next section. 
5.6  Employment, Income Distribution, and Poverty 
As  in  most  semi-industrial  countries,  employment  and  distributional 
statistics are generally less reliable and precise than  the national accounts 
data. The predominance of  the informal components of  the rural and urban 
sectors  gives  rise  to  notorious  measurement  problems.  The  overriding 697  TurkeyKhapter 5 
concern (of richer households) with tax liability results in underreporting of 
nonwage  incomes  in  household  surveys,  which  are  not  undertaken  on  a 
regular basis. Furthermore, the researchers often eschew consistency checks 
on the overall patterns suggested by population censuses and sectoral income 
aggregates. While being aware of  these problems, we nevertheless believe 
that  the  available  statistics  permit  a  broad  intertemporal  evaluation  of 
employment  and  distributional  characteristics,  provided  we  maintain  our 
focus on proportional shifts over time. The presentation of this section draws 
on earlier detailed studies by Celisun (1986a,  1986b). 
Table 5.9 provides data on sectoral employment and productivity differen- 
tials  for  the  benchmark  years  1973,  1978,  and  1983.  The  productivity 
differentials have been estimated in constant 1973  prices and in current prices. 
The differences in constant price and current price estimates reflect relative 
changes in  the net  prices  (or alternatively,  domestic terms of  trade) of  the 
major activity sectors of the Turkish economy. 
As  regards  the  employment  picture,  table  5.9 shows  the  predominant 
position  of  agriculture  in  labor  absorption  and  the  limited  employment 
generated by  manufacturing, as  noted  in  the cross-country comparisons in 
chapter  1. Compared with  the  1973-78  period,  the  creation of  new  non- 
agricultural  employment was much less in  1978-83,  despite a massive cut 
in  nonagricultural  real  wages.  It  is  evident  that  factor  substitution  faces 
structural  rigidities  in  the  short and even medium run.  Labor reallocation 
requires  time and new capital formation in structurally  rigid  semi-industrial 
economies. 
Table 5.9  Sectoral Employment Levels and Productivity Differentials, 1973-83 
1.  Agnculture 
2.  Nonagriculture 
a. Mining and energy 
b  Manofacturing 
c. Construction 
d. Trade 
e. Public services 
f. Other services 
g.  Subtotal (a to f) 
3  Total 
Productivity  Differentials" 
Employment (thousand workers)  Constant 1973 Prices  Current Prices 
1973  1978 
9.580  9,537  -- 
I60  217 
1,419  1,610 
456  562 
544  646 
682  1,083 
1.417  1.594 
4,678  5,712 















1973  1978  1983  1978  1983 
1.0  1.0  1.0 
5.9  7.3  4.7 
4.2  3.9  4.4 
4.0  3.5  3.3 
8.0  1.7  7.9 
6.1  3.9  3.9 
4.8  5.0  4.3 
5.1  4.7  4.6 
I .o  I .o 
6.0  10.2 
4.6  7.  I 
3.6  3.5 
8.1  12.9 
3.9  3.3 
5.0  6.3 
4.9  6.5 
Source:  Celdsun (1986b) 
"Productivity  differentials are measured  hy  the  ratios of per  worker  value  added in  agriculture to per  worker  value 
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If relative prices had remained constant between  1978 and  1983, sectoral 
productivity  differentials  would  have  exhibited  the  normally  expected 
pattern,  involving  reductions  in  the  ratio  of  per-worker-value-added  in 
nonagriculture to per-worker-value-added in agriculture.  Such a trend would 
have reduced  income  disparities  in  Turkey.  However,  measured  in  current 
prices, this ratio increased in a highly pronounced fashion after 1978. At the 
sectoral  level,  the  observed  changes  in  productivity  differentials  caused 
sizable income transfers from agriculture and public services to mining and 
energy, manufacturing,  and trade sectors.’ 
In this context, it may be noted that the ratio of the value-added aggregate 
of  the  (wholesale  and  retail)  trade  sector  to  agricultural  value  added 
increased  to  93 percent  in  1983 from  55  percent  in  1978.  This  was  a 
significant  distributional  shift,  considering  the  fact  that  trade  sector 
employment  was  about 0.7 million  workers as compared  with  9.5 million 
workers absorbed in agriculture in  1983. 
After the review of productivity differentials and implied shifts in sectoral 
incomes,  we may  consider the proportional  changes  in  factor  shares, i.e., 
functional distribution of income as shown in table 5.10 for the benchmark 
years  1978, 1981,  and  1983.  Part  A  in  this  table  gives  the  labor  market 
aggregates,  which  point  to the  high levels  of  surplus  labor  in  the Turkish 
economy.’  With  the  virtual  termination  of  labor  migration  to  Western 
Europe,  Turkey’s  rapid  population  growth-in  combination  with  the 
remaining  underemployment  in  agriculture-is  likely  to  aggravate  the 
unemployment problem in the future. 
Part  B  in  table  5.10 provides  estimates  for economywide factor  shares 
derived  from the general equilibrium analysis of Celisun (1986a),  which is 
calibrated  to  the  official  employment  and  wage  data.  Part  C  gives  factor 
shares  for the  large  manufacturing  industry.  For  lack  of  relevant  details, 
agricultural income in part B covers all income elements in this sector. The 
data  point  out  the  rapid  reduction  in  the  share of  formal  wage  income 
(including civil servant salaries) in GDP from 33 percent in 1978 to about 21 
percent  in  1981, which  reflects  in  a cumulative  way  the  workings  of  the 
1979-80  inflation and price adjustments.’  Part C data have a more narrow 
coverage,  but  largely  confirm  the  falling  wage  shares  in  the  post-1978 
period. 
An earlier study by DerviS and Robinson (1980) examines the structure of 
income inequality in Turkey on the basis of household survey data for 1973. 
It concludes that the rural-urban household income differential is unusually 
large  in  Turkey  and  a  major  source  of  overall  inequality  in  the  size 
distribution of income. Taking this study as a point of departure, the analysis 
in Celhun (1986b) provides synthetic estimates for inequality  and poverty 
measures for the benchmark years  1973,  1977, and  1983 on the basis of  all 
available  national  income,  employment,  and  distributional  data  in  Turkey. 
The estimated Gini coefficients for 1973, 1978, and  1983 are 0.515, 0.509, 699  TurkeyIChapter  5 
Table 5.10  Labor Market and Functional  Distribution of Income, 1978-81 
1978  1981  1983 
A.  Labor market (thousand workers)" 
I.  Employment 
2.  Labor supply 
3.  Surplus labor 
B. Functional distribution of nominal GDP (f.c.), % 
1.  Agricultural  income 
2.  Nonagricultural  income 
a.  Formal wage laborb 
b.  Nonwage labor 
c. Gross profits 
3.  Total (= GDP) 
I. Private 
C.  Factor shares in large manufacturing. % 
a.  Nonprimary  inputs 
b.  Wages 
c. Gross profits 
d.  Total (= gross output) 
a.  Nonprimary inputs 
b.  Wages 
c. Gross profits 
d. Total (= gross output) 

















































Source:  Celhn  (1986a) for parts A and B. and TUSIAD (1986) for part C 
Note:  f.c.: factor cost. 
"Rounded figures. 
hIncludes government employee salaries. 
and 0.522,  respectively (see tables A.27 and  A.28 in  the stat. app.). The 
share of  households under the poverty line (about 12,000 TL in 1973 prices 
and  $1,455 in  1983 prices) is estimated as 32, 25, and 30  percent in these 
three benchmark years. The estimated real mean income growth rates for top 
decile and bottom decile are 22.7 and 22.8 percent in  1973-78,  and  -8.4 
and -  18.6 percent in 1978-82,  respectively. 
This review  of  labor and  distributional indicators brings  out  two  main 
points.  First,  the  heavy  external borrowing of  the  mid-1970s temporarily 
allowed an improved income distribution. Second, the mechanisms used  in 
extricating the economy from the crisis produced by  the mismanagement of 
the  macroeconomic balances and  external debt  mechanisms in  1974-77, 
namely large shifts in  economywide prices,  led to  a dramatic reversal in 
distributional trends. 
5.7  Recapitulation 
How do we  interpret the relatively successful adjustment of the Turkish 
economy in the post-1980 period? It seems clear that the radical changes in 
the structure of relative prices and the attendant shifts in patterns of  income 700  Merih Cellsun and Dani Rodrik 
distribution, were the key internal mechanism in attaining inflation reduction 
and  initiating export-led  recovery.  Our review  pinpointed the key  role  of 
economywide price changes,  which  produced  demand restraint,  enhanced 
savings performance in  the public  sector, greater  financial intermediation, 
and expenditure switching toward exports. While the pre-reform ( 1978-79) 
period  had  already set into motion some of  these changes,  especially the 
decline in  real  wages  and  agriculture’s terms of  trade,  the policies of  the 
1980s consolidated and accentuated them.  The structural rigidity inherited 
from the previous inward-oriented policies served to magnify the requisite 
changes in relative prices needed to bring about the desired consequences. 
The net  effect was  a substantial increase in  the profitability  of  the  traded 
manufactures sector and a sharp reduction in labor and farmers’ incomes. On 
the whole, these also implied an improvement in the terms of  trade of  the 
public  sector  vis-h-vis  the  private  sector,  which  proved  the  key  to  the 
reduction of real private expenditures. Since the public sector is a high saver 
at the margin, these relative price changes not only resulted in expenditure 
switching,  in  the  conventional  manner,  but  were  also  instrumental  in 
reducing absorption. 
This chapter has also shown the favorable macrolevel impact of  external 
financial assistance in the earlier years of  Turkey’s post-1980 program. The 
rise in debt-service ratios after 1983 poses new policy problems, however, as 
will be discussed in later chapters. 